As for European military forces, their potential use of Galileo services should be considered in the political context of the building-up of a common EU foreign security and defence policy and of European military capacities. On this issue, the European Parliament recently voted to ask the EU/ESA Joint Undertaking on Galileo not to exclude the possibility for European military forces to use Galileo in the context of peace-keeping operations.
Among Galileo services, the PRS seems the best candidate to meet European military forces' positioning and timing requirements. (All current or foreseen weapon systems have a requirement of on-board positioning and/or timing capabilities for navigation, localisation, or synchronisation. Current systems mainly use inertial and/or GPS technology.)
From a technical point of view, no specific military features should be implemented in PRS so that the service remains usable by European military forces in an operational context.
Galileo Frequency Selection
On December 1, 2001, a few days before a meeting of the EU transport Council had been expected to decide on the Galileo development phase, EU defence ministers received a letter sent by the U.S. deputy secretary of defence. The letter raised concerns about potential interference between Galileo and GPS. According to the U.S. deputy secretary, if Galileo promoters choose the same frequencies for the PRS service of Galileo as those used by the military service of GPS, the United States and NATO would be unable to jam the PRS service without jamming the military service of GPS (a navigation warfare, or NAVWAR, concept).
The United States is also emphasising the fact that this constraint would jeopardise the GPS modernisation programme, which seeks a clear separation between civil and military frequencies. This separation is designed to enable the denial of navigation signals to potential adversaries and, at the same time, to guaranty use of GPS by U.S. and NATO forces.
Responding to U.S. Concerns
Obviously, all EU NATO defence ministers want to avoid jeopardising the operational efficiency of NATO forces. However, the EU bodies responsible for the Galileo project are the ones that must demonstrate their ability to make this project as secure as GPS. This security must be as much for the PRS service itself as for its use.
Making the PRS approach compatible with U.S. security concerns suggests the need for an evolution of the NAVWAR concept. This concept should no longer be based on the distinction between civil and military signals, but instead should focus on distinguishing between non-secured and secured signals. (Secured signals are PRS, GPS M-code, and GPS PPS-P(Y) code; non-secured signals are all other GNSS signals.)
Assuming that European Union authorities and member states are able to guaranty PRS security, Galileo will not decrease NATO forces' efficiency. Instead, it will reinforce it while providing a navigation tool complementary and interoperable with GPS.
Frequency overlay of Galileo PRS signal and GPS M-code signal actually has advantages for the United States. Sharing GPS frequencies with their European allies, under a mandate to take all the precautions against interference (especially with GPS), significantly strengthens the ability to protect these frequencies. Europe and the United States would gain a common and mutual interest to protect these frequencies against any unallied third state which intends to develop a new GNSS, possibly with fewer precautions and divergent security objectives.
Furthermore, the EU is on its way to creating an appropriate security body in charge of the Galileo project. This body will propose the context of discussion between the United States, the EU, NATO, and the member states. The EU security organisation will also determine the appropriate Galileo features needed to reinforce global security on both sides of the Atlantic.
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this paper do not reflect any official stand; they are the personal views of the author.
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