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From
the Editor
The Phantom Menace
Although it is still a concept striving
to become a program, Europe's Galileo system is already producing
effects. How else can one describe the profound changes proposed
by the Clinton administration for the schedule and nature of GPS
civil modernisation?
Until the European Commission (EC)
and the European Space Agency (ESA) committed e80 million in 2000
to undertake a definition phase for the European contribution to
a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), the U.S government
seemed willing to implement additional civil signals on a relaxed
timeline that would not be fully realised until well into the next
decade. In recent weeks, however, the administration has launched
an initiative to push modernisation forward and add a new civil
frequency at L2 and the new military signal on 9 to 14 of the Block
IIR generation of GPS satellites now being launched.
The civil signal at L2, the new military
signal, and the third civil frequency will also be added to all
of the follow-on generation of IIF satellites. Until this decision,
upgrades were only going to occur beginning with the seventh of
the IIFs; none of the IIRs were going to be modernised. The first
enhanced IIF is scheduled for launch in 2005. The new military signal
and the L2 civil signal should reach initial operational capability
(IOC) in 2009. IOC for the civil signal at the new L5 frequency
location should be achieved by 2012.
To get the work done, the U.S. Department
of Defence (DoD) is seeking $460.5 million for Fiscal Year 2001
(FY01), nearly twice as much money as the agency received for the
GPS program this year. The DoD request would pay for the civil portion
of the modernisation, at least for the time being, with the expectation
that civil budgets will be tapped later to reimburse the military
expenditure on their behalf. This decision came in the wake of Congress's
rejection last year of a FY00 request of $18 million in the Federal
Aviation Administration's budget to pay for the civil share of GPS
modernisation.
True, the administration's initiative
could be coincidentally rather than causally related to work on
Galileo. The better-than-expected performance of the existing Block
II and IIA satellites has postponed the need to launch IIRs as scheduled.
The new plan also accommodates DoD's desire for additional time
to define new features in the IIF spacecraft and find the optimal
solutions for its requirements. In any case, the acceleration of
improvements in GPS should certainly be welcomed by the user community
and manufacturing sector alike.
Nonetheless, one school of thought
believes that there are no coincidences in such matters.
With Galileo's full operational capability
(FOC) rather ambitiously set for 2008, the new U.S. modernisation
timeline could go far in closing a window of opportunity through
which the considerable comparative advantages of the proposed European
system could lure customers and establish market share.
Meanwhile, the U.S. strategy in bilateral
negotiations with the European Union (EU) on GPS/Galileo cooperation
appears designed to delay an agreement by downplaying the nature
of the talks and pushing a philosophical rather than practical agenda
to the fore. Thus, while the EU wants to discuss such matters as
a standard for signal design and compatible frequency allocations,
the U.S. State Departmentled team wants to wrestle with more
abstract principles: open markets, a ban on user fees, and interoperability.
However, precisely because the EC
and ESA are in the definition phase for Galileo, U.S. participation
in a timely discussion of their technical issues would seem like
the most cooperative mode, and more likely to produce reciprocal
benefits in matters of GPS/Galileo interoperability. If that is
what U.S. negotiators truly are aiming for.
Several years ago, the official U.S.
posture toward the development of other GNSS systems ostensibly
changed from overt opposition to neutrality. But the cool reception
to European overtures makes one wonder if the U.S. game is to freeze
out Galileo.
Let's see if we can put a face on
American anxieties regarding Galileo: The EC and ESA come up with
a technical design that is fundamentally incompatible with GPS for
purposes of cost-effective integrated equipment -- perhaps at C-band
frequencies rather than L-band. They create fee-based and encrypted
controlled access services with both equipment carriage and safety-of-life
service mandated by EU regulatory agencies.
Toss in a closed market, or at least
one that taxes all GNSS equipment, and the security risk of a high-precision
navigation and positioning system operated and controlled by civilian
managers. Maybe we should even add service liability requirements
that favour Galileo certification over GPS.
It is an ugly and disheartening picture.
Somewhat like that painted from time to time by zealots for non-GPS
radionavigation systems: Under pressure from the DoD operators of
the system during U.S. involvement in hostile military actions abroad,
GPS is suddenly switched off with little or no warning to users
around the world. Or, after having suckered the entire world into
investing in GPS technology (and preventing the entry of other service
providers), the United States begins charging for services.
In such situations we can give way
to our fears, or we can play on the fears of others to advance our
purposes. But what we might end up accomplishing instead is a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Both sides have proponents of some or all of these negative
scenarios. Intransigence in negotiations strengthens the advocates
of the narrow view, the mutually exclusive option. Neither Europe
nor the United States will be served by the ascendance of these
viewpoints. If we cannot share a common dream of GNSS, we might
have to endure separate nightmares of mutually exclusive systems.
Glen Gibbons
Editor
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